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THE FUNCTION OF PRIVATE DEFENSE IN THE REPRESSION OF CRIMIE. 1
GIULIO Q. BATTAGLINI.

2

Crime is a negation of social harmony, to which the law annexes
specific consequences. The enforcement of these consequences appertains
to the State. Thus the State by legal means is continually engaged in
the struggle against crime, and its action in this regard we style public
defense. Where, however, the efficacy of public defense falls short the
prevention of a criminal act may yet be possible to the individual; here
we have what. is known as private defense. And private defense in alliance and cobperation with public defense is a powerful force for the repression of crime.
The relative positions of public and private power toward the criminal demand attention. I venture to quote what I have said in another
place regarding the punitive function of the State. "Punishment is a
means of defense prescribed by social necessity, and indispensable to the
State. The State assumes the Strafgewalt, the power of punishing, and
assigns it a place in the sphere of law. The very fact that the power
of punishing moves within the sphere of law, or, in other words, that
legal limits are set to this naturally unlimited power, gives rise to a
true right to punish on the part of the State. The State becomes authorized by law to exact from its subjects who have infringed its penal
commands the conduct called for by its own legally recognized interest
in punishing (interesse punitivo giuridicamente valevole)-that is to
say, submission to punishment."3 Hence the State in the exercise of
public power opposes itself to the criminal as a legally delegated punitive authority.
On the other hand, the citizen, so far as his direct opposition to
crime becomes necessary, exercises neither authority nor punishing
power: he is merely the defender of his own person, thereunto authorized by law. And this for the obvious reason that in himself he is neither authority nor dispenser of punishment. The State alone wields
the power of punishment because in the idea of this power is inherent
the notion of a judicial faculty exercisable by a superior-a faculty
'Translated from the Italian by Robert W. Millar, Esq., of the -Chicago bar.
'Professor in the University of Sassari, Italy..
'Battaglini, Le Norme del diritto penale ed i loro destinatari, pp. 40, 41.
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which the citizen is without. "Celui qui se dfend est partie," as a dis4
tinguished legal scholar has excellently put it.
From the principle that the State alone exercises the punishing
power it follows that the reaction of private defense does not exclude
that of the public power: the wrong-doer still remains subject to the
command that he submit to punishment. Thus far I have suggested
nothing new.5 But the matter does not rest here. For at this point
the question arises: If the criminal has already suffered harm from
the exercise of private defense, why should he still be obliged to undergo
the punishment imposed by the State?
The reason is not far to seek. Criminal law is a system of rules in
which find expression the exigencies of the juridical community as a
whole-exigencies of abstention from certain acts abstractly designated
as crimes, exigencies of submission to punishment in the concrete case.
It is the will of the entire community that the individual who violates a
penal command to which he is validly subject shall undergo the punishment prescribed. The fact that in a given case private defense has
been exercised, however lawfully, against the wrongdoer does not invalidate the will of the juridical community, i. e., the State, inasmuch as
the self-defender exercises no right to punish and hence does not encroach upon the right of the State to punish. The law-breaker has
attacked not merely the citizen who has thus defended himself, but the
community as a whole, which for certain species of attacks metes out
certain equivalents.
In saying that the citizen who acts in lawful self-defense is exercising neither authority nor punishing power, I have indicated in substance the contrast betweeen public and private defense. The State's
duty of punishing implies a proceeding regulated by legal rules. For
public defense is a defense which proceeds with the utmost deliberation,
dissociated from every movement of instinct. Public defense presupposes the established fact of a crime; the individual who acts in defense of his own person or that of another has no opportunity in the
presence of the threatened wrong to sit in judgment upon the truth or
falsity of his own impressions. Private defense is a defense organized
on the spur of the moment.
The stamping out of crime is one of the foremost duties both of
the State and the citizen. The State has not only a legal right to punish, but also a legal duty to punish, which takes precedence of the right.
From the social viewpoint it is the obligation of the State to repress
'Pellegrino Rossi, Trait6 de droit p6nal, bk. i, ch. VIII.
'Cf. Rossi, op. cit. ibid; Alimena, Principii di diritto penale, Val. I, p. 5so.
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crime, which is the important thing. When we describe this obligation
as "legal," there at once comes to mind the idea of a State subordinate
to law. And modern thought, headed by the great Jellinek, is unable
to conceive the existence of any other than a "juridical State."
Thus the repression of crime, as a function, is incumbent on the
State: the State alone by legal means must undertake it. It is possible
for the individual (and lawful private defense is but an extremely small
part of the phenomenon) to strive against the inroads of crime on
society in a manner yet more energetic than the State. A notable example of this is afforded by those private institutions for the prevention
of juvenile delinquency which proceed on the thoroughly accepted principle that for the child education has a much greater value than punishment. 6 But with the individual, warfare on crime remains an ethicosocial duty: it never attains the peculiarly imperative nature of a legal
duty.
The motives of human action are egoistic. Egoism does not, however, exclude altruism, since altruism is nothing else than egoistic aspiration to which a particular bent has been imparted. Man is in general
altruistic when it is possible for him to be ego-altruistic. Now the legislator knows how to deal with egoism. He recognizes that it cannot be
successfully overcome by human force-that the most that can be done
is to deflect it in a particular direction.' And just here lies the basis
of private defense. When his legal interests are in danger of attack
and the power of the State is nob, present to defend them, no menace of
punishment could hinder the citizen from his own immediate reaction,
simply because as a motive any such menace could never counteract the
motive which determines slf-defense. Self-defense is determined by
the natural instinct of preserving one's own life and property ;8 and it is
for the legislator to impose motives only where he finds a normal state
of determinability. The self-defender is unpunishable, because citizens
are not disposed to submit to threatened" injury even at the legislator's
command. The legislator yields so far as is reasonable. And reason
cannot condemn the innate and invincible impulses of man.
Apart from'the considerations just advanced, the impunity of private defense is required by the interest of the State. The fact that the
State. recognizes the right of its subjects to self-help in the defense of
'The facts recently adduced by Stoppato in his admirable paper read before
the Society for the protection of minors under conditional sentence (Patroawto
dei mintorenni condanitata condizionahnente), of Bologna, strikingly emphasize
the usefulness of this principle.
'Analogously, Hold von Ferneck, Die Rechtswidrigkeit, Vol. I, p. 36.
-- 'Cf. Ferri, Sociologia crimiinale, N. 47.
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their imperiled legal interests operates as a considerable reinforcement
of the motives of abstention, furnished by the legal command. The possibility of private defense and its effective exercise thus tend to prevent
crime. The wrong-doer is an individual in whom the criminal motives
have taken the upper hand of the motives of social harmony. Now there
is an instant when his mind is swayed by conflicting motives -and
the motives of social harmony are ready to succumb to the criminal
motives. An inhibitory force opposes itself to the latter and renders
them powerless-the prospect of the consequences of the crime. And in
this prospect he sees the danger of punishment from the State combined
with that of private reaction. Punishment administered by the State
and private reaction are thus the two great counter-motives of crime.
The interests of the whole juridical community demand that private
defense, so far as it cobperates with public defense, be allowed free play
within its legal limits. In this consists the whole function of private
defense. In exercising the right of self-defense the citizen is asserting
the high value of legal personality. His legal personality is the concern
not merely of the man himself, but of all the members of society: it is
something whose value all the associated men desire to see preserved.
The citizen in the exercise of the right of self-defense is therefore really
engaged in the defense of law and society.
But if private defense is adequately to fulfill this important social
function, the public power should put no obstacles in its way. The
recognition is forced upon us that in its actual working the right of
private defense does not exert upon the criminal motives that inhibitory
force of which it is capable. We ought not to let the citizen be deterred
from the exercise of this right by the fear of running afoul of the law.
The intending criminal must be made to understand that the citizen
whose legal interests are attacked can repel the assailant without incurring legal danger. In short, resoluteness must be lent to private defense
and the display of private energy against the law-breaker encouraged
if we mean to impress on the criminal mind the existence of private
defense as a real inhibitory force side by side with that of punishment
on the part of the State. Tolstoi's remark that criminals are the most
energetic of men is after all far from paradoxical. Honest men must
be educated to energy and activity if we intend to combat crime effectively. To that end the law should be so modified that where there is
every reason to believe that a man has acted in lawful self-defense he
should, pending judicial inquiry, be allowed his liberty without the
necessity of giving bail. Moreover, a summary method of procedure
should be devised so that he may be relieved from annoyance at the
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earliest possible moment. These changes will result in giving full sway
to the vital force of private reaction.
In such a state of the law the self-defender, conscious of the legality of his own act and unrestrained by fear of legal harm, would have
no hesitation in informing the police authorities of the repulsio vialentia-which he has effected. It is the interest of the State to know who
takes life criminally and who by virtue of its permission; hence the
obligation of laying the facts before the proper authorities. But the
omission of this duty ought merely to constitute a misdemeanor (trasgressione di Polizia), entailing only the payment of a fine.
Furthermore, the judge ought to put himself in the place of the
man who has been compelled to exercise the right to self-defense and
determine the case according to its particular circumstances and the
particular psychic condition of the self-defender. For otherwise the fear
of being punished because of an excessive exercise of the right would
check the salutary activity of self-defense, would render it ineffective and
thus operate in favor of crime and to the detriment of legal security.
Sometimes the initial intent to steal a thing of insignificant value may
become transformed into an intent to kill. The judge then ought to
bear in mind that the intensity of the danger canrot be determined with
mathematical exactitude, that it may increase or diminish during the
conflict and that its degree at the outset cannot always be regarded as
a safe criterion. As a preliminary to the application of the law there
here devolves upon the judge a difficult psychological function.
I have said that the citizen has an ethico-social duty of self-defense.
Does morality then approve the taking of life? Not at all. But morality
does impose the duty of combating crime with every available means, and
in this end even the taking of life is justifiable. The citizen is under
the ethical duty of preventing the commission of crime; this duty ho
may even fulfill by killing his assailant. The taking of life is not per
se enjoined by morality, but morality enjoins the end which sometime'
cannot be attained without the taking of life. In social ethics the maxim
of Machiavelli that the end justifies the means does not meet with rejection. For social well-being is to be attained at any cost and morality
in looking to a higher appreciation of the value of human life necessarily
demands the repression of crime.
'To the same effect: Manzini, La politica criminale ed il problema della
lotta contro la delinquenza e la malavita,-Revista penale, Vol. LXXIII, p. 8.

